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A
fter a quarter-century of lackluster
gains, the U.S. economy experienced a
remarkable resurgence in productivity
growth during the second half of the
1990s. From 1995 to 2000, output per
hour in nonfarm business grew at an
average annual rate of about 2
1/2 percent compared
with increases of only about 1
1/2 percent per year
from 1973 to 1995.1Our earlier work, along with other
research, linked this improved performance to the
information technology (IT) revolution that has
spread through the U.S. economy.2 Indeed, by 2000
this emphasis on the role of information technology
had become the consensus view. 
However, shortly after this consensus emerged, the
technology sector of the economy went into a tailspin
as demand for IT products fell sharply. Reflecting this
retrenchment, stock prices for many technology firms
collapsed, and financing for the sector dried up. These
developments raised questions about the robustness
of the earlier results that emphasized the role of infor-
mation technology. They also cast some doubt on the
sustainability of the rapid productivity growth in the
second half of the 1990s. Nonetheless, the recent data
remain encouraging. Productivity gains have contin-
ued to be strong, with output per hour rising 2 per-
cent over the four quarters of 2001—a much larger
increase than is typical during a recession. 
Against the backdrop of these developments,
much effort has been devoted to estimating the
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underlying trend in productivity growth (see, in par-
ticular, Baily 2002; DeLong 2002; Gordon 2002;
Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh 2002; Kiley 2001; Martin
2001; McKinsey Global Institute 2001; and Roberts
2001). For the most part, these papers take a rela-
tively optimistic view of the long-run prospects for
productivity growth. 
We add to this literature in two ways. First, to
assess the robustness of the earlier evidence on
the role of information technology, we extend the
growth-accounting results in Oliner and Sichel
(2000a) through 2001. These results continue to
support the basic story in our earlier work; namely,
the data still show a substantial pickup in labor pro-
ductivity growth and indicate that both the use of
information technology and efficiency gains associ-
ated with the production of information technology
were central factors in that resurgence.
Second, to assess whether the pickup in produc-
tivity growth since the mid-1990s is sustainable, we
analyze the steady-state properties of a multisector
growth model. This exercise allows us to translate
alternative views about the evolution of the tech-
nology sector (and other sectors of the economy)
into “structured guesses” about future growth in
labor productivity. As highlighted by Jorgenson
(2001), the pace of technological progress in high-
tech industries—especially semiconductors—likely
will be a key driver of productivity growth going for-
ward. Thus, we develop a model that is rich enough16 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Third Quarter 2002
then present the steady-state results. Appendix 1
fully describes our multisector model and derives
all the theoretical results that underlie our growth-
accounting and steady-state estimates. Appendix 2
provides detailed documentation for each data
series used in the paper. 
Analytical Framework
T
his paper employs the neoclassical growth-
accounting framework pioneered by Solow
(1957) and used extensively by researchers ever
since.3 The neoclassical framework decomposes the
growth in labor productivity, measured by output per
hour worked, into the contributions from three broad
factors: increases in the amount of capital per hour
worked (usually referred to as capital deepening),
improvements in the quality of labor and growth in
multifactor productivity (MFP). MFP is the residual
in this framework, capturing improvements in the
way that firms use their capital and labor but also
embedding any errors in the estimated contributions
from capital deepening and labor quality. 
The growth-accounting framework can be tailored
to address many different issues. We employ it to
assess the growth contribution from IT capital, taking
account of both the use of this capital throughout
the economy and the efficiency gains realized in its
production. Given this focus, we construct a model
of the nonfarm business economy that highlights
key IT-producing industries. Our model, which
extends the two-sector models developed in Martin
(2001) and Whelan (2001), divides nonfarm busi-
ness into five sectors. Three sectors produce final
IT goods—computer hardware, software, and com-
munication equipment—and a large non-IT sector
produces all other final goods and services. The
fifth sector in the model produces semiconductors,
which are either consumed as an intermediate input
by the final-output sectors or exported to foreign
firms. To focus on the role of semiconductors in the
economy, the model abstracts from all other inter-
mediate inputs.
Our model relies on several assumptions that are
typically imposed in growth-accounting studies. In
particular, we assume that all markets are perfectly
competitive and that production in every sector is
characterized by constant returns to scale. Labor
and capital are assumed to be completely mobile,
an assumption that implies a single wage rate for
labor across all sectors and a single rental rate for
each type of capital. Within this competitive market
structure, we assume that firms set their investment
and hiring decisions to maximize profits. Moreover,
when firms purchase new capital or hire additional
to trace out the aggregate effects of these driving
influences. We view this steady-state machinery not
as a forecasting model per se but rather as a tool for
generating a likely range of outcomes for labor pro-
ductivity growth over roughly the next decade.
Beyond that horizon, the uncertainty about the
structure and evolution of the economy is too great
for our steady-state approach to offer much insight.
Our structured guesses of labor productivity
growth range from 2 percent to roughly 2
3/4 percent
per year. The lower end of the range reflects conser-
vative assumptions for key parameters in our model.
Notably, in this scenario, we assume that the rate of
technological advance in the semiconductor indus-
try drops back to its historical average from the
extremely fast pace in the second half of the 1990s
and that the semiconductor and other IT sectors fail
to grow any further as a share of (current-dollar)
economic activity. In contrast, to generate the upper
end of the range, we assume that the pace of tech-
nological advance in the semiconductor sector
reverts only halfway to its historical average and
that the various IT sectors continue to grow as a
share of the economy. Of course, much uncertainty
attends this exercise, and we also discuss more
extreme scenarios in which labor productivity
growth in the steady state would fall short of 2 per-
cent or would exceed 3 percent. We believe, how-
ever, that these more extreme alternatives are less
likely to occur than the scenarios generating labor
productivity growth in the 2 to 2
3/4 percent range.
This range, which includes the pace recorded over
the second half of the 1990s, puts us squarely in
the camp of those who believe that a significant
portion—and possibly all—of the mid-1990s’ pro-
ductivity resurgence is sustainable.
The next section of the paper provides a largely
nontechnical overview of the analytical framework.
Next, we briefly discuss the data we use and then
describe the growth-accounting results extended
through 2001. We continue by laying out the alter-
native steady-state scenarios that we analyze and
The pace of technological progress in high-
tech industries—especially semiconductors—
likely will be a key driver of productivity growth
going forward.1. This paper was already in production at the time of the July 2002 annual revision of the National Income and Product
Accounts (NIPAs), and all numbers in the paper refer to the prerevision data. Had we been able to take the revision into
account, the basic story of the paper would remain intact although productivity growth and high-tech capital deepening in
recent years would be a bit lower than the figures we present. 
2. See Oliner and Sichel (2000a), Bosworth and Triplett (2000), Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2000), Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000),
Jorgenson (2001), and Whelan (2000). For a more skeptical view of the role of information technology written at that time,
see Gordon (2000). 
3. See Steindel and Stiroh (2001) for an overview of growth accounting, issues related to the measurement of productivity, and
trends in productivity growth in the postwar period.
4. Time subscripts on both the income shares and the various growth rates have been suppressed to simplify the notation. We
use log differences to measure growth rates. The income share applied to a log difference between periods t and t + 1 is mea-
sured as the average of the shares in these two periods. 
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workers, we assume they do not incur any adjust-
ment costs that would reduce output while these
new inputs are integrated into the firms’ production
routines. Finally, we do not explicitly model cyclical
changes in the intensity with which firms use their
capital and labor. 
These assumptions yield a tractable analytical
framework by abstracting from some notable features
of the actual economy. One could be concerned that
these assumptions are so restrictive as to distort the
empirical results. In consideration of these concerns,
we would not advocate using a framework like ours
to decompose year-to-year changes in productivity
growth because cyclical factors omitted from the
model could substantially affect the results. However,
Basu, Fernald, and Shapiro (2001) showed that the
basic characterization of productivity trends in the
1990s remains intact even after allowing for adjust-
ment costs, nonconstant returns to scale, and cyclical
variations in the use of capital and labor.
With this background, we now discuss the key
analytical results from our model. The rest of this
section presents and interprets these results; for-
mal derivations can be found in Appendix 1. 
Growth in aggregate labor productivity. As
shown in the first proposition of Appendix 1, our
model yields a standard decomposition of growth
in aggregate labor productivity. Let Z
•
denote the
growth rate of any variable Z. Then, the growth of
output per hour for nonfarm business as a whole
can be written as
(1)
where Y denotes nonfarm business output in real
terms; H denotes hours worked in nonfarm business;
KC, KSW, KM, and KO denote the services provided by
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the stocks of computer hardware, software, commu-
nication equipment, and all other tangible capital,
respectively; and q denotes labor quality. The α terms
are income shares; under the assumptions of our
model, the income share for each input equals its
output elasticity, and the shares sum to 1. The second
line of equation 1 merely rewrites the decomposition
with more compact notation, where j indexes the
four types of capital.4
Equation 1 shows that growth in labor produc-
tivity reflects capital deepening, improvements in
labor quality, and gains in MFP, with the overall
growth contribution from capital deepening con-
structed as the sum of the contributions from the
four types of capital. Each such contribution equals
the increase in that type of capital per work hour,
weighted by the income share for that capital. This
decomposition is entirely standard and matches the
one used in Oliner and Sichel (2000a, b). Note that
equation 1 does not identify the sectors using capi-
tal and labor; all that matters is the aggregate
amount of each input. Under our assumptions, we
need not keep track of the individual sectors
because each type of capital has the same marginal
product regardless of where it is employed, and the
same holds for labor. Hence, transferring capital or
labor from one sector to another has no effect on
labor productivity for nonfarm business as a whole.
Our growth-accounting decomposition depends
importantly on the income shares of the various
types of capital. These income shares are not
directly observable, and we estimate them in accor-
dance with the method used by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics. In this framework, the income share for
capital of type j is
(2) αj = (R + δj – Πj)TjpjKj/pY,
where R is a measure of the nominal net rate of
return on capital, which is the same for all types of
capital under our assumption of profit maximization18 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Third Quarter 2002
our model) would be omitted from the decomposi-
tion of aggregate MFP growth.
To see this point more clearly, note that equation 3
can be rewritten as
(4)
where 1 + θ equals the ratio of domestic semicon-
ductor output to domestic use of semiconductors
and β
S
i denotes semiconductor purchases by final-
output sector i as a share of the sector’s total input
costs. This result, derived in proposition 2, shows
that the semiconductor sector, in effect, can be ver-
tically integrated with the final-output sectors that it
supplies. MFP growth in each vertically integrated
sector—the term in brackets—subsumes the MFP
gains at its dedicated semiconductor plants. Thus,
equation 4 shows that the Domar weighting scheme
(in equation 3) can be viewed as aggregating MFP
growth from these vertically integrated sectors.
To make use of equation 3, we need to estimate
MFP growth in each sector of our model. We do this
with the so-called dual method employed by Triplett
(1996) and Whelan (2000), among others. This
method uses data on the prices of output and inputs,
rather than their quantities, to calculate sectoral
MFP growth. We opt for the dual approach because
the required data are more readily available.
The basic intuition behind the dual approach can
be explained with an example involving semicon-
ductors, the prices of which have trended down
sharply over time. To keep the example simple,
assume that input prices for the semiconductor
sector have been stable. Given the steep decline in
semiconductor prices relative to the prices for other
goods and services, MFP growth at semiconductor
producers must be rapid compared to that else-
where. Were it not, semiconductor producers would
be driven out of business by the ever-lower prices
for their output in the face of stable input costs.
This example illustrates that relative growth rates
of sectoral MFP can be inferred from movements in
relative output prices.6
We rely on this link to estimate sectoral MFP
growth. Proposition 3 provides the details, which
involve some messy algebra. Roughly speaking, each
sectoral MFP growth rate can be written as 
(5) MF
•
P i = MF
•
P o – πi + terms for the relative growth 
in sectoral input costs, 
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and full capital mobility; δj is the depreciation rate
for capital of type j;  Πj measures any expected
change in the value of this capital over and above
that captured in the depreciation rate; T j is a com-
posite tax parameter; pjKj is the current-dollar stock
of this capital; and pY is total current-dollar income
in the nonfarm business sector. The intuition behind
equation 2 is straightforward. In a competitive mar-
ket, each dollar of type j capital must earn a gross
annual return that covers the net return common
to all capital as well as the loss of value that this
capital suffers over the year and the taxes imposed
on the income it generates. The product of this
gross return and the current-dollar stock equals
the current-dollar income assumed to be earned by
type j capital, which we divide by total income in
nonfarm business to obtain the desired income
share. Once we calculate each capital share in this
way, the labor share is simply one minus the sum of
the capital shares.
Aggregate and sectoral MFP growth. The
term for aggregate MFP growth in equation 1 can be
decomposed into the contributions from MFP
growth in each sector. In particular, proposition 1 in
the model appendix shows that
(3)
where i indexes the four final-output sectors, s
denotes the semiconductor sector, and theµ term
for each sector represents its output expressed as
a share of total nonfarm business output in cur-
rent dollars. This sectoral weighting scheme was
initially proposed by Domar (1961) and formally
justified by Hulten (1978). The Domar weights
sum to more than one, an outcome that may seem
odd at first glance.5 However, this weighting scheme
is needed to account for the production of inter-
mediate inputs. Without this “gross-up” of the
weights, the MFP gains achieved in producing











In addition to explaining the source of the
productivity pickup in the 1990s, we wish to
estimate a plausible range for productivity
growth in the future.19 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Third Quarter 2002
output” sector, which serves as our benchmark sec-
tor. If input costs grew at the same rate in every
sector, the change in relative output prices would
fully characterize the differences in sectoral MFP
growth. However, because semiconductors loom
large in the cost structure of the computer industry,
we know that input costs for that industry are falling
relative to those for other sectors. The additional
terms in equation 5 take account of these differences
in sectoral input costs.
Note that equation 5 determines relative rates
of MFP growth, not the absolute rate in any sec-
tor. We pin down the absolute MFP growth rates
in two different ways, the first of which uses equa-
tion 3 to force the sectoral MFP growth rates to
reproduce our estimate of aggregate MFP growth.
This case represents the methodology we use to
compute historical growth contributions through
2001. In the second case, which we use for our
steady-state analysis, we condition on an assumed
pace of MFP growth in the “other final-output”
sector, which generates the remaining sectoral MFP
growth rates via equation 5 and aggregate MFP
growth via equation 3.
Analysis of the steady state. In addition to
explaining the source of the productivity pickup in
the 1990s, we wish to estimate a plausible range for
productivity growth in the future. To develop such
a range, we impose additional steady-state condi-
tions on our model, closely following the two-sector
analysis in Martin (2001) and Whelan (2001). 
Among the conditions imposed to derive steady-
state growth, we assume that output in each sector
grows at a constant rate (which differs across sec-
tors). In addition, we impose conditions that are
sufficient to force investment in each type of capi-
tal to grow at the same (constant) rate as the stock
of that capital. Taken together, these conditions can
be shown to imply that production in each final-out-
put sector grows at the same (constant) rate as the
capital stock that consists of investment goods pro-
duced by that sector. Two other important conditions
are that labor hours grow at the same (constant) rate
in each sector and that all income shares and sectoral
output shares remain constant.
Under these steady-state conditions, proposition 4
shows that the growth-accounting equation for aggre-




P is calculated, as above, from equation 3.
Note that equation 6 contains no explicit terms for
capital deepening, in contrast to its non-steady-
state counterpart, equation 1. No such terms appear
because the steady-state pace of capital deepening
is determined endogenously within the model as a
function of the sectoral MFP growth rates. Hence,
the summation on the right side of equation 6 rep-
resents the growth contribution from this induced
capital deepening. With this interpretation, it becomes
clear that equations 1 and 6 share a common struc-
ture: Both indicate that the growth of labor produc-
tivity depends on capital deepening, improvements
in labor quality, and growth in MFP.
To further interpret equation 6, consider the
growth-accounting equation (outside the steady
state) for a simple one-sector model:
(7)
Now impose the steady-state condition that output





into equation 7, noting that αK + αL = 1 under
constant returns to scale. The result is
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5. It is easy to see that the weights sum to more than one if semiconductor producers sell all of their output to the four final-
output sectors, with none sold as exports. In this case, semiconductors are strictly an intermediate input, and production by
the four final-output sectors accounts for all nonfarm business output. Hence, the µ terms for these sectors sum to one before
adding in µS. With a little algebra, one can show that the µ terms also sum to more than one in the more general case that
allows for exports of semiconductors. 
6. Under perfect competition, the growth rate of MFP in each sector can be inferred exactly from relative price movements.
However, if markets are not perfectly competitive, then the dual methodology would yield an inaccurate reading on MFP
growth to the extent that relative price changes resulted from swings in margins rather than technological developments. Of
course, if there is imperfect competition but margins are constant, then MFP growth rates still can be inferred exactly from
relative price movements because changes in margins would not be a source of changes in relative prices. For the semicon-
ductor sector—where market concentration in microprocessors suggests that this potential problem with the dual method-
ology could be particularly acute—Aizcorbe (2002) found that a conventional Tornquist index of Intel microprocessor prices
fell 24
1/2 percent per quarter on average from 1993 to 1999; adjusted for movements in Intel’s margins over this period, the
index declined 21 percent per quarter. Thus, swings in margins appear to have had a relatively small average effect on chip
prices over this period.20 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Third Quarter 2002
eral equipment, we follow Whelan (2000) and set
these depreciation rates equal to a geometric approx-
imation calculated from BEA capital stocks and
investment flows. For personal computers, we are
uncomfortable with the BEA’s procedure and instead
set the depreciation rate for PCs equal to the 30 per-
cent annual rate for mainframe computers. (See
Appendix 2 for a discussion of this issue.) To estimate
the capital gain or loss term in the gross return (Πj),
we use a three-year moving average of the percent
change in the price of each asset. The moving aver-
age smooths the often volatile yearly changes in
prices and probably conforms more closely to the
capital gain or loss that asset owners expect to bear
when they make investment decisions. Finally, to
calculate the net return (R), we mimic the BLS pro-
cedure, which computes the average realized net
return on the entire stock of equipment, software,
and structures. By using this average net return in
the income share for each asset, we impose the neo-
classical assumption that all types of capital earn
the same net return in a given year.
To implement the sectoral model of MFP, we
need data on final sales of computer hardware,
software, and communication equipment as well
as data on the semiconductor sector. Our data on
final sales of computer hardware came from the
NIPAs, and we used unpublished BEA data to cal-
culate final sales of software and communication
equipment. For the semiconductor sector, we used
data from the Semiconductor Industry Association
as well as data constructed by Federal Reserve Board
staff to support the Fed’s published data on U.S.
industrial production. 
Decomposition of Labor Productivity Growth
A
s discussed above, our earlier research docu-
mented that information technology was a key
driver behind the resurgence in labor productivity
growth during the second half of the 1990s. Recent
developments—including the bursting of the
Nasdaq bubble and the dramatic retrenchment in
the high-tech sector—have raised questions about
the robustness of those results. By extending our
estimates through 2001, we can assess whether
recent data still support the basic story in our earlier
research. We describe our new numbers and then
compare them to our earlier results.
Results through 2001. Table 1 presents our
decomposition of labor productivity growth in the
nonfarm business sector through 2001. As shown in
the first line of the table, growth in labor productiv-
ity picked up from about 1.5 percent per year in the
first half of the 1990s to about 2.4 percent since
where the second equality uses the fact that (αK/ αL)
=(1/αL) –1 when αK +αL=1. Comparing equations 6
and 8 shows that our steady-state growth-accounting
decomposition is the multisector counterpart to the
decomposition in a one-sector model.
Summary. We use equations 1–3 and 5 to decom-
pose the observed growth in labor productivity
through 2001. Equation 1 provides the structure for
the decomposition, while equation 2 shows how we
calculate the income shares, and equations 3 and 5
(implemented with the dual method) show how we
relate aggregate MFP growth to its sectoral compo-
nents. To estimate the growth of labor productivity
in the steady state, we replace equation 1 with equa-
tion 6, but otherwise we use the same machinery as
for the historical decompositions.
Data
T
his section provides a brief overview of the data
used for this paper; a detailed description appears
in Appendix 2. To estimate the decomposition of
labor productivity growth, we rely heavily on data
from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and
the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). Our starting
point is the data set assembled by the BLS for its
estimates of multifactor productivity. These annual
data cover the private nonfarm business sector in the
United States and provide measures of the growth
of real output, real capital input, labor hours, and
labor quality. At the time we were writing, the BLS
data set ran through 2000, and we extended all
necessary series through 2001.
The income shares in our growth-accounting cal-
culations depend on estimates of the gross rate of
return earned by each asset (R + δj – Πj). To measure
the components of the gross return, we rely again
on data from the BEA and BLS. With just a few
exceptions, the depreciation rates (δj) for the vari-
ous types of equipment, software, and structures
are those published by the BEA. Because the BEA
provides only limited information on the deprecia-
tion rates for components of computers and periph-
Are the results from earlier research that
emphasized the role of information technology
still valid given the sharp contraction in the
technology sector?7. Note that the figures for output per hour in Table 1 are based on the BLS published series for nonfarm business output. This
series is a product-side measure of output, which reflects spending on goods and services produced by nonfarm businesses.
Alternatively, output could be measured from the “income side” as the sum of payments to capital and labor employed in that
sector. Although the two measures of output differ only slightly on average over long periods of time, a sizable gap has
emerged in recent years. By our estimates, the acceleration in the income-side measure was about one-third percentage point
greater (at an average annual rate) after 1995. We employ the published product-side data to maintain consistency with other
studies; in addition, if an adjustment were made to output and labor productivity growth, it is not clear how that adjustment
should be allocated among the components of capital deepening and MFP growth. Nonetheless, the true pickup in produc-
tivity growth after 1995 could be somewhat larger than shown in our table.
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1995.7 Rapid capital deepening related to informa-
tion technology capital—the greater use of infor-
mation technology—accounted for about three-fifths
of this pickup (line 3). Other types of capital (line 7)
made a much smaller contribution to the accelera-
tion in labor productivity, while the contribution
from labor quality actually fell across the two periods.
Multifactor productivity (line 9) is left to account for
a little less than half of the improvement in labor
productivity growth.
Next, we decompose this overall MFP contribu-
tion into its sectoral components in order to estimate
the growth contribution from the production of
information technology. Lines 10–14 of Table 1 display
this sectoral decomposition. The results show that
the MFP contribution from semiconductor producers
(line 10) jumped after 1995. Given our use of the dual
methodology, this pickup owes to the more rapid
decline in semiconductor prices in this period, which
the model interprets as a speedup in MFP growth.
Post-1995
1974–90 1991–95 1996–2001 change
(1) (2) (3) (3) minus (2)
1. Growth of labor productivity1 1.36 1.54 2.43 .89
Contributions from2
2. Capital deepening .77 .52 1.19 .67
3. Information technology capital .41 .46 1.02 .56
4. Computer hardware .23 .19 .54 .35
5. Software .09 .21 .35 .14
6. Communication equipment .09 .05 .13 .08
7. Other capital .37 .06 .17 .11
8. Labor quality .22 .45 .25 –.20
9. Multifactor productivity .37 .58 .99 .41
10. Semiconductors .08 .13 .42 .29
11. Computer hardware .11 .13 .19 .06
12. Software .04 .09 .11 .02
13. Communication equipment .04 .06 .05 –.01
14. Other sectors .11 .17 .23 .06
15. Total IT contribution3 .68 .87 1.79 .92
1 In the nonfarm business sector, measured as the average annual log difference for the years shown multiplied by 100.
2 Percentage points per year.
3 Equals the sum of lines 3 and 10–13.
Note: Detail may not sum to totals because of rounding.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on BEA and BLS data
TABLE 1
Contributions to Growth in Labor Productivity, Using Data as of March 200222 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Third Quarter 2002
reflected the plunging costs of semiconductor inputs,
which our sectoral decomposition attributes to MFP
growth in the semiconductor industry, not in com-
munication equipment. Thus, the dual methodology
suggests that the MFP gains in both software and
communication equipment have been smaller than
those in the computer sector.
Putting together the information technology pieces
(line 15), greater use of information technology and
faster efficiency gains in the production of IT cap-
ital goods more than accounted for the 0.89 per-
centage point speedup in labor productivity growth
after 1995. This large contribution can also be seen
in Chart 1; the blue bars show the contribution from
the use of IT and the gray bars show the contribu-
tion from the production of IT on a year-by-year
basis. As the chart shows, these contributions surged
after 1994. Although they dropped back in 2001, the
contributions for that year remain well above those
observed before 1995. Based on these results, we
conclude that recent data confirm the main findings
in our earlier work. Namely, the resurgence in labor
productivity is still quite evident in the data, and
information technology appears to have played a
central role in this pickup. 
Further comparison to our earlier work.
Table 2 compares our latest numbers to those in
In contrast, the MFP contribution from the other
information technology sectors taken together (lines
11–13) rose only a little after 1995 compared with
the first half of the 1990s.
For computer hardware, the particularly rapid
decline in prices after 1995 might have led one to
believe that MFP growth in this sector had increased
dramatically. However, as indicated earlier, the com-
puter sector—as we define it—excludes the produc-
tion of the semiconductors embedded in computer
hardware. Thus, MFP in the computer sector repre-
sents only efficiency gains in the design and assembly
of computers, not in the production of the embedded
semiconductors. Accordingly, our results indicate
that the faster declines in computer prices after
1995 largely reflected the sharp drop in the cost of
semiconductor inputs rather than independent devel-
opments in computer manufacturing. 
The MFP contributions from the software and
communication equipment sectors were fairly small
during both the 1991–95 and 1996–2001 periods.
According to the published numbers, the relative
prices of both software and communication equip-
ment fell much less rapidly than did relative com-
puter prices during these periods.8 In addition, for
communication equipment, our numbers indicate
that much of the relative price drop that did occur


























Contributions from the Use and Production of Information Technology to 
Growth of Labor Productivity in Nonfarm Business
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Oliner and Sichel (2000a).9 The first column of the
table shows contributions to the pickup in labor pro-
ductivity growth from our earlier paper, the second
column presents estimates through 2000 using
recent data, and the third column repeats the con-
tributions through 2001 shown in Table 1. In addition
to the inclusion of data for 2000, the numbers in the
second column differ from those in the first because
of data revisions since our earlier results were com-
pleted.10 Clearly, incorporating data for 2000 and
revisions for earlier years changed our results rela-
tively little. The contribution to the productivity
pickup from software capital deepening increased,
but this increase was offset by a more negative
Oliner and Sichel
(2000a) This paper This paper
through 1999 through 2000 through 2001
1. Acceleration in labor productivity1 1.04 1.00 .89
Contributions from2
2. Capital deepening .48 .57 .67
3. Information technology capital .45 .54 .56
4. Computer hardware .36 .36 .35
5. Software .04 .13 .14
6. Communication equipment .05 .07 .08
7. Other capital .03 .02 .11
8. Labor quality –.13 –.20 –.20
9. Multifactor productivity .68 .62 .41
10. Semiconductors .27 .30 .29
11. Computer hardware .10 .06 .06
12. Other sectors3 .31 .26 .06
1 In the nonfarm business sector, measured as percentage points per year.
2 Percentage points per year.
3 Includes producers of communication equipment and software.
Note: Detail may not sum to totals due to rounding.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on BEA and BLS data
TABLE 2
Acceleration in Labor Productivity between 1991–95 and Post–1995 Period,
Effect of New Data and Revisions
8. Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000) raised the possibility that software prices may have fallen faster than reported in the official
numbers. While this speculation may be correct, software has historically been a craft industry, in which highly skilled pro-
fessionals write code line by line. In the 1960s and 1970s, several studies examined costs per line of code written. Phister
(1979, 502) estimated a 3.5 percent annual reduction in the labor required to produce one thousand lines of code. Zraket
(1992) argued that the nominal cost per line of code in the early 1990s was little changed from twenty years earlier, a sce-
nario that would yield a real decline similar to Phister’s. Of course, the more recent adoption of software suites, licenses, and
enterprisewide software solutions may well have led to dramatic declines in the effective price of software. All told, we
believe that considerable uncertainty still attends the measurement of software prices.
Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000) also suggested that prices of communication equipment may have fallen faster than reported
in official statistics. Recent work by Doms (2002) provides support for that perspective.
9. Table 2 shows separate MFP contributions only for the semiconductor and computer sectors to maintain comparability with
our earlier work.
10. The most important data revisions that we factored in were the July 2000 and July 2001 NIPA revisions released by the BEA
(which are fully reflected in the latest BLS multifactor productivity data) and the official published estimates of capital stocks
for software. (In our earlier work, we had included our own estimate of software capital stocks.) In addition, we have made
some minor adjustments to our estimation procedures, but these changes had relatively small effects.24 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Third Quarter 2002
has contributed significantly to the pickup in labor
productivity growth, quite apart from developments
in IT-producing industries. Second, the much-
reduced MFP acceleration in other industries likely
reflected cyclical factors.12 Identifying the magnitude
of such cyclical influences is challenging, and we
believe that the trend cannot be inferred from the
average growth rate between 1995 and 2001. The
first year of that period, 1995, was midway through
the cycle, while the last year, 2001, was a recession
year.13 Thus, taking an average over the 1995–2001
period implicitly draws a line from a point at midcycle
to a point near the bottom of the cycle. Such a line
likely understates the trend over this period. 
Labor Productivity Growth in the Steady State 
H
ow much of the resurgence in labor productiv-
ity growth in the second half of the 1990s is
sustainable? To address this question, we use the
steady-state machinery described earlier to generate
a range of likely outcomes for labor productivity
growth in the future. We do not regard these steady-
state results as forecasts of productivity growth for
any particular time period. Rather, this exercise yields
structured guesses of the sustainable growth in labor
productivity consistent with alternative scenarios for
the evolution of key features of the economy.
To construct this range of likely outcomes, we set
lower and upper bounds on steady-state parameters
and then solve for the implied rates of labor produc-
tivity growth. We believe that these scenarios encom-
pass the most plausible paths going forward, but there
is substantial uncertainty about future productivity
developments. Hence, as we will discuss, the sus-
tainable pace of labor productivity growth could fall
outside the range that we consider most likely. The
rest of this section describes the lower- and upper-
bound parameter values that we chose, presents our
steady-state results, and compares our results to
those obtained by other researchers. 
Parameter values. Table 3 displays the many
parameters that feed into our model of steady-state
growth. To provide some historical context, the first
three columns of the table show the average value
of each parameter over the 1974–90, 1991–95, and
1996–2001 periods. The next two columns present
our assumed lower-bound and upper-bound values
for each parameter in the steady state, and the final
column briefly indicates the rationale for these
steady-state values.14
Lines 1–15 of the table list the parameters needed
to compute aggregate and sectoral MFP growth in
the steady state. These parameters include each
sector’s current-dollar share of nonfarm business
contribution from labor quality and a somewhat
smaller contribution from MFP growth.
Extending the results through the recession year
2001 tempers the step-up in labor productivity growth
(line 1), as would be expected given the procyclical
behavior of productivity gains. At the same time,
line 2 indicates that the growth contribution from
capital deepening increased with the inclusion of data
for 2001. The large implied contribution in 2001 may
seem puzzling in light of the recession-related down-
turn in investment spending. However, recall that
capital deepening reflects the ratio of capital services
to hours worked. The decline in hours in 2001, other
things being equal, boosts the capital-hours ratio. Also,
note that our growth accounting uses annual-average
data. Because investment spending weakened over
the course of 2001, annual averaging smooths this
decline relative to the change observed over the four
quarters of the year. Similarly, the Tornquist weighting
procedure delays the impact of such changes by using
an average of this year’s and last year’s capital income
shares as aggregation weights for the capital deep-
ening contributions. Thus, some of the effects of the
recession on corporate profits (and hence on the cap-
ital income shares) will not show up in our numbers
until 2002. Indeed, a back-of-the-envelope calculation
suggests that the contribution of capital deepening
will drop back in 2002.11
The final effect of folding in data for 2001 is the
noticeably smaller contribution of MFP to the post-
1995 step-up in labor productivity growth (line 9).
Virtually the entire downward revision is in the large
residual sector consisting of all nonfarm business
except the computer and semiconductor industries
(line 12). 
Some observers might argue that the very small
acceleration of MFP outside these IT-producing
sectors indicates that the productivity benefits of IT
have been either narrowly focused or have been
largely reversed over the past year. However, we are
not inclined to accept either interpretation for two
reasons. First, the use of IT throughout the economy
Some observers might argue that the very small
acceleration of MFP outside the IT-producing
sectors indicates that the productivity benefits
of IT have been either narrowly focused or have
been largely reversed over the past year.25 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Third Quarter 2002
output (the µs), outlays for semiconductors as a
share of total input costs in each final-output sector
(the βs), the rate of output price inflation in each
sector relative to that in the other-final-output sector
(the πs), and the growth of MFP in the other-final-
output sector (MFP O). 
Although the steady-state bounds for some of
these parameters require no discussion beyond the
brief rationale in the table, others need further
explanation.15 Starting with the output shares, we
calibrated the steady-state bounds from the plots in
Chart 2. The short lines in each panel represent the
bounds, which can be compared to the history for
each series. The current-dollar output shares for
producers of computer hardware and communication
equipment have each fluctuated in a fairly narrow
range since the mid-1980s. Our steady-state bounds
largely bracket those ranges. For producers of soft-
ware and semiconductors, the current-dollar output
shares have trended sharply higher over time, and
our steady-state bounds allow for some additional
increase from the average level in recent years.16
Among the semiconductor cost shares (the βs),
we set the share for computers equal to 0.30, the
middle of the range employed by Triplett (1996).
For software, we set the share to zero. The share for
communication equipment is shown in Chart 3. This
share has risen quite a bit since the early 1990s,
reflecting the increasing amount of computer-like
technology in communication equipment. We set the
steady-state bounds on the assumption that this
trend will persist. 
This increase in the semiconductor content of
communication equipment implies that the relative
price for such equipment is likely to fall more rapidly
in the future than it has over history. We built that
expectation into the steady-state bounds for πM,
shown on line 14. These values were chosen to
ensure that the implied MFP growth rate for the
sector, computed by the dual method, remained
close to the average pace over 1996–2001.
This issue does not arise for other sectors, where
the semiconductor cost shares are assumed to change
little, if at all, going forward. For these sectors
(lines 11–13), we set the bounds on relative price
changes (the πs) by reference to historical patterns.
The lower bound for each sector equals the average
rate of relative price change over 1974–2001, while
the upper bound lies midway between that average
and the most rapid rate of relative price decline for
the three subperiods since 1974. Thus, we do not
assume that the extremely rapid declines in com-
puter and semiconductor prices over 1996–2001
will persist in the steady state, even in our opti-
mistic scenario. 
Lines 16–28 of the table list the components of
the capital income shares. For the nominal rate of
return on capital and the asset-specific depreciation
11. To show this, we calculated capital deepening for 2002 on the assumption that the growth rate of real investment in high-
tech equipment snaps back to its robust average pace during 1996–2000 and that hours fall nearly 1 percent in 2002 on an
annual average basis as projected in Macroeconomic Advisers’ January 2002 Economic Outlook. Even under this optimistic
assumption for investment and sluggish forecast for hours, the contribution of capital deepening to labor productivity growth
in 2002 would be below its 2001 value (but still significantly above its pre-1995 value).
12. Even though MFP is often associated with technological change, short-run movements in MFP can be heavily influenced by
cyclical factors that have little relation to technological change. For further discussion of this point, see Basu, Fernald, and
Shapiro (2001).
13. Inferring the trend from the average growth rate between 1995 and 2000 also may be problematic because the average cov-
ers a period from midcycle to peak. Moving the initial year back to the prior peak in 1990 is not appealing because we are
interested in what happened to productivity beginning in the mid-1990s.
14. Note that the upper-bound value for each parameter yields a higher rate of productivity growth than the lower-bound value.
For some parameters, such as relative prices, the upper-bound value is numerically smaller than the lower-bound value. 
15. In performing similar exercises, DeLong (2002), Kiley (2001), and Martin (2001) start with demand elasticities for high-tech
products to generate output and income shares. In contrast, we set assumptions for output shares and other key parame-
ters directly. Because relatively little is known about high-tech demand elasticities, we prefer the transparency of directly
setting output shares and other parameters based on their historical patterns.
16. The output share for the semiconductor sector plunged in 2001 to the lowest level since 1994 owing to the deep cutbacks
in spending on high-tech equipment during the recession. In setting the steady-state bounds, we assumed that the cyclical
drop would be reversed as the economy recovers from recession.
How much of the resurgence in labor pro-
ductivity growth in the second half of the
1990s is sustainable?26 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Third Quarter 2002
Historical averages Steady-state values
1974– 1991– 1996– lower upper Method for setting
Parameter 1990 1995 2001 bound bound steady-state values
Output shares1 (µ)
1. Computer hardware 1.06 1.19 1.32 1.10 1.40 See Chart 2.
2. Software .84 1.79 2.70 3.10 3.60 See Chart 2.
3. Communication equipment 1.80 1.68 1.83 1.60 2.00 See Chart 2.
4. Other final-output sectors 96.33 95.45 94.14 94.20 93.00 Implied by lines 1–3 and 5.
5. Net exports of semiconductors –.04 –.11 .00 .00 .00 1996–2001 average.
6. Total semiconductor output .30 .58 .91 1.00 1.20 See Chart 2.
Semiconductor cost shares1 (β)
7. Computer hardware 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 Assumed constant value.
8. Software .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 Assumed constant value.
9. Communication equipment 1.17 4.59 8.88 13.00 16.00 See Chart 3.
10. Other final-output sectors .00 .27 .37 .46 .46 Implied by lines 1–4, 6–9, and 36.
Relative inflation rates2 (π)
11. Semiconductors –28.90 –21.75 –44.71 –31.01 –37.86 Lower bound is 1974–2001 average;
12. Computer hardware –19.29 –17.79 –27.15 –20.71 –23.93 upper bound is midway between that
13. Software –4.13 –4.83 –3.90 –4.21 –4.52 value and fastest historical decline.
14. Communication equipment –2.44 –4.06 –5.80 –6.00 –7.75 Calibrated to keep the sector’s MFP
growth rate near the 1996–2001 pace.
15. Growth of MFP O
3 .11 .17 .23 .11 .23 Used historical range.
16. Nominal return on capital3 (R) 7.88 4.29 4.55 4.55 4.55 1996–2001 average.
Depreciation rates3 (δ)
17. Computer hardware 29.74 30.11 30.30 30.30 30.30 1996–2001 average.
18. Software 34.87 37.04 38.46 38.46 38.46 1996–2001 average.
19. Communication equipment 13.00 13.00 13.00 13.00 13.00 1996–2001 average.
20. Other business fixed capital 5.87 6.08 6.10 6.10 6.10 1996–2001 average.
Expected capital gains/losses4 (Π)
21. Computer hardware –12.70 –11.79 –23.21 –17.50 –20.36 See footnote 5.
22. Software 3.27 –.56 –.31 –.44 –.50 See footnote 5.
23. Communication equipment 3.65 –.07 –3.01 –4.00 –5.75 See footnote 6.
24. Other business fixed capital 6.31 2.52 2.55 2.54 2.53 See footnote 5.
Capital-output ratios (TpKK/pY )
25. Computer hardware .0192 .0293 .0294 .0300 .0360 See Chart 4.
26. Software .0191 .0440 .0618 .0800 .0900 See Chart 4.
27. Communication equipment .0876 .1087 .0951 .0875 .1025 See Chart 4.
28. Other business fixed capital 2.4227 2.2648 2.1008 1.9000 2.0500 See Chart 4.
Income shares1 (α)
29. Computer hardware .92 1.34 1.71 1.57 1.99 Implied. See Chart 5.
30. Software .75 1.85 2.67 3.48 3.92 Implied. See Chart 5.
31. Communication equipment 1.48 1.88 1.96 1.89 2.39 Implied. See Chart 5.
32. Other business fixed capital 18.00 17.78 17.04 15.42 16.65 Implied. See Chart 5.
33. Other capital7 9.81 8.90 8.93 8.93 8.93 1996–2001 average.
34. Labor 69.04 68.25 67.69 68.72 66.13 Implied by lines 29–33.
Other parameters
35. Growth of labor quality3 (q) .32 .65 .38 .30 .30 Assumed slower growth.
36. Ratio of domestic semiconductor
output to domestic use (1 + θ) .89 .86 1.03 1.03 1.03 1996–2001 average.
1 Current-dollar shares, in percent.
2 Output price inflation in each sector minus that in the “other final-output” sector, in percentage points.
3 In percent.
4 Three-year moving average of price inflation for each asset, in percent.
5 Lower bound is average over 1991–2001; upper bound is midway between that value and the smaller of the 1991–95 and 
1996–2001 values.
6 The lower and upper bounds equal the corresponding values for the relative inflation rate of communication equipment (line 14), plus 2 
percentage points—the assumed rate of inflation in the “other final-output” sector.
7 Includes land, inventories, and tenant-occupied housing. 
TABLE 3
Parameter Values for Steady-State Calculations
}{17. The drop in R had a much greater effect on the income share for this broad capital aggregate than on the income shares for
computers, software, or communication equipment. For these high-tech assets, the rapid trend rate of depreciation is the
dominant piece of the gross return, overwhelming even sizable movements in R.
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rates, we simply project forward the average values
for 1996–2001. These parameters varied only slightly
between the first and second halves of the 1990s;
moreover, the higher nominal return on capital over
1974–90, which was driven in part by the elevated
pace of inflation over that period, is not appropriate
for the current low-inflation environment. For the
next element of the income share, the expected
capital gain or loss on the asset, we set the steady-
state bounds in essentially the same way as we did
for the relative inflation rates. For all types of capital
except communication equipment, we chose these
bounds by reference to the historical data, though
we looked back only to 1991 to avoid building in the
higher rates of inflation that prevailed over 1974–90.
The bounds for communication equipment were set
to the analogous bounds for the relative price decline
on line 14, plus 2 percentage points. This add-on
for the assumed rate of inflation in the other-final-
output sector converts the relative price change
into an absolute change.
The final piece of the income share is the (tax-
adjusted) capital-output ratio, expressed in current
dollars (TpKK/pY). Chart 4 displays this ratio back
to 1974 for the four types of capital. For computer
hardware and communication equipment, where the
capital-output ratio has not displayed a clear trend
of late, we set the bounds to keep the ratio in its neigh-
borhood of recent years. In contrast, for software and
other fixed capital, we chose the bounds to allow for
a continuation of longer-term trends. Chart 5 shows
the implied bounds for the capital income shares
along with the historical series for these shares. The
one series that bears comment is the share for other
equipment and nonresidential structures, which
plummeted in 2001 as the recession-induced decline
in corporate profits depressed the nominal return
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Note: Each subcomponent within a category is tax-weighted. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on BEA, BLS, and other data18. As noted earlier, our model does not explicitly account for adjustment costs. Nevertheless, we recognize that such costs
could have important implications for labor productivity growth, as emphasized by Kiley (2001) and Basu, Fernald, and
Shapiro (2001). Implicitly, our steady-state estimates of labor productivity growth embed the average historical value of
adjustment costs. Specifically, if adjustment costs have held down labor productivity growth on average historically, our
growth-accounting framework will sweep these effects into the residual—which is MFP growth in “other final output.”
Because our steady-state estimates depend on MFP growth in that residual category, the average historical magnitude of
adjustment costs is implicitly built into these estimates. 
19. It is reassuring that the results generated by the steady-state model over historical periods are well aligned with measured
productivity growth. In particular, if we use the steady-state model with the historical average parameter values in Table 3,
it returns an average growth rate for labor productivity of 1.57 percent over 1974–2001, very close to the actual growth rate
of 1.62 percent over this period. 
29 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Third Quarter 2002
income share imply at least a partial reversal of this
cyclical decline.
The final parameter of note is the growth of labor
quality (line 35). We assume that labor quality will
increase 0.3 percent per year in the steady state,
noticeably slower than its average annual rise over
recent decades. Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh (2002)
suggest a step-down in labor quality growth of sim-
ilar magnitude while Aaronson and Sullivan (2001)
project a slightly larger drop-off going forward.
Results. Table 4 contains the “structured guesses”
of labor productivity growth in the steady state
using lower-bound and upper-bound parameter
values.18 As shown on line 1, the lower-bound param-
eter values generate steady-state growth in labor
productivity of about 2 percent while the upper-
bound values imply growth of slightly more than
2
3/4 percent.19 This range, which sits well above
the sluggish pace realized from the early 1970s to
the mid-1990s, suggests a relatively optimistic out-
look for labor productivity.
To provide intuition for the steady-state range,
note that the lower-bound figure of about 2 percent is
roughly 
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ital in both the lower- and upper-bound scenarios,
just as it was in the latter half of the 1990s. More
broadly, as shown in line 7, the combined contribu-
tion of both the induced use and the production of
IT accounts for about three-fourths of overall labor
productivity growth in both the lower- and upper-
bound scenarios.
As indicated above, our intent is to provide a likely
range for steady-state growth in labor productivity,
not to bound all possible outcomes. For example, the
steady-state model can generate labor productivity
growth above 3 percent per year if we assume that
semiconductor and computer prices continue to fall
at the 1996–2001 pace and allow the semiconductor
output share to rise by the amount seen between the
first and second halves of the 1990s. Conversely, we
can generate numbers for labor productivity growth
between 1
1/2 and 1
3/4 percent per year if we assume
that price declines for computers and semiconduc-
tors revert to their historical average and that the
computer and semiconductor output shares go back
down to levels seen in the first half of the 1990s. So,
while we are comfortable with a likely range for
steady-state labor productivity growth from 2 per-
cent to 2
3/4 percent, we are well aware of the uncer-
tainty that attends the exercise we have undertaken.
Comparison to other research. Table 5 com-
pares the steady-state results in this paper to those
obtained by other researchers. There are two points
to take away from this table. First, the range of esti-
mates is very wide, extending from about 1
1/4 percent
up to 3
1/4 percent. This range highlights the uncer-
productivity growth during 1996–2001. This slow-
down occurs because we assume that the rates of
decline in semiconductor and computer prices revert
to their long-run historical averages from the very
rapid pace realized in the second half of the 1990s.
These assumptions produce a marked slowdown in
MFP growth in the semiconductor sector and, to a
lesser extent, in the computer sector. Nonetheless,
labor productivity growth for nonfarm business as
a whole remains above the 1974–95 average because
the IT sectors, taken together, constitute a larger part
of the economy than they did in this earlier period.
The upper-bound figure of about 2.8 percent in the
steady state is almost 
1/2 percentage point above the
1996–2001 pace. The model generates this step-up
even though the price declines for semiconductors
and computers in the steady state (and hence the
rates of MFP growth) are assumed to be less rapid
than those in the second half of the 1990s. The
countervailing factor is that the semiconductor
sector and other IT sectors grow as a share of the
economy compared to that period. The greater
importance of these sectors with relatively fast MFP
growth more than makes up for the slower price
declines for semiconductors and computers.
The remaining lines of Table 4 show the major
factors that contribute to steady-state growth in labor
productivity. These numbers highlight the impor-
tant role of IT in future labor productivity growth.
In particular, a comparison of lines 2 and 3 indi-
cates that the induced capital deepening in the
steady state is very heavily skewed toward IT cap-
Using lower- Using upper-
bound parameters bound parameters
1. Growth of labor productivity1 1.98 2.84
Contributions from2
2. Induced capital deepening .97 1.47
3. Information technology capital .88 1.31
4. Other capital .09 .16
5. Labor quality .30 .30
6. Multifactor productivity .72 1.07
7. Total IT contribution3 1.50 2.17
1 In the nonfarm business sector, measured in percent.
2 Percentage points per year.
3 Equals line 3 plus the contributions included in line 6 from producers of computer hardware, software, communication equipment,
and semiconductors.
Note: Detail may not sum to totals because of rounding.
TABLE 4
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tainty surrounding the future path of productivity
growth. Second, despite the wide band of uncertainty,
most of the point estimates (or range midpoints) fall
within our range of 2 to 2
3/4 percent per year. Thus,
there is considerable agreement among researchers
that productivity growth likely will remain fairly
strong going forward. 
Conclusion
R
ecent debates about the pickup of productivity
growth in the United States have revolved around
two questions. First, are the results from earlier
research that emphasized the role of information
technology still valid given the sharp contraction in
the technology sector? Second, how much of the
improvement in labor productivity growth since the
mid-1990s could plausibly be sustained? This paper
addressed both questions.
As for the robustness of earlier results, we used
data through 2001 to reassess the role of informa-
tion technology in the productivity revival since the
mid-1990s. These new growth-accounting results
indicate that the story told in Oliner and Sichel
(2000a) still stands. Namely, output per hour accel-
erated substantially after 1995, driven in large part
by greater use of IT capital goods by businesses
throughout the economy and by more rapid effi-
ciency gains in the production of IT goods.
To address the question of sustainability, we ana-
lyzed the steady-state properties of a multisector
growth model. This framework translates alternative
views about the evolution of the technology sector
and other features of the economy into estimates of
labor productivity growth in the steady state. When
we imposed relatively conservative values for key
parameters, this framework generated steady-state
growth in labor productivity of about 2 percent per
year. This estimate rose to roughly 2
3/4 percent when
we imposed somewhat more optimistic assumptions.
We refer to these estimates as structured guesses
and think of them as identifying a likely range of pro-
ductivity outcomes over roughly the next decade. Of
course, any such exercise entails substantial uncer-
tainty, and we also discussed scenarios that would
generate a wider range of outcomes.
Our analysis highlights that future increases in
output per hour will depend importantly on the
pace of technological advance in the semiconduc-
tor industry and on the extent to which products
embodying these advances diffuse through the
economy. This observation is consistent with the
emphasis in Jorgenson (2001) on semiconductor
technology. Gaining a deeper understanding of
technological developments in this sector should
be a high priority for those attempting to shed light
on trends in productivity.
Point estimate Range
1. This paper 2.0 to 2.8
2. Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh (2002)1 2.25 1.3 to 3.0
3. Congressional Budget Office (2002)2 2.2
4. Economic Report of the President (2002)3 2.1
5. Baily (2002) 2.2 to 2.7
6. Gordon4 2.0 to 2.2
7. Kiley (2001) 2.6 to 3.2
8. Martin5 2.2 1.5 to 2.4
9. McKinsey (2001)6 ≈2.0 1.6 to 2.5
10. Roberts7 2.6
11. DeLong (2002) “like the fast-growing late 1990s”
1 Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh measure productivity growth for a broader definition of the economy than do the other papers. To make 
their numbers comparable to those in the other studies, add 0.15 percentage point to the point estimate and range shown for 
Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh in the table.
2 Table 2–5.
3 Table 1–2, p. 55.
4 Based on personal correspondence with Robert Gordon, March 24, 2002.
5 In personal correspondence of August 2002, Bill Martin reported these numbers for the period 2002–11; these figures are lower than 
those in Martin (2001).
6 Chapter 3, exhibit 13.
7 Unpublished update to Roberts (2001).
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T
his appendix presents our model of sectoral
productivity and derives key results for our
analysis of growth in aggregate labor productivity.
The model divides nonfarm business into five
sectors. Four of the sectors produce final out-
put (computer hardware, software, communication
equipment, and all other final output). The fifth
sector produces semiconductors, which are either
consumed as an intermediate input by the final-
output sectors or exported to foreign firms. To focus
on essential linkages, the model abstracts from all
intermediate inputs besides semiconductors.
The Model
Let Yi (i = 1,…, 4) denote the production of the
final-output sectors. Each sector produces invest-
ment goods (Ii) and consumption goods (Ci) for
domestic use, where Ii and Ci are identical goods
sold to different agents (firms buy Ii, while house-
holds buy Ci). Let Ii,j and Ii,s denote, respectively,
the purchases of Ii by final-output sector j ( j =
1,…, 4) and by semiconductor producers, with Ii=
ΣjIi,j + Ii,s. Each sector also produces goods for
export (Xi). To produce this output, sector i
employs labor (Li) and various types of capital
(Kj,i, j = 1,…, 4), and it purchases semiconduc-
tors (Si) as an intermediate input.1 With this
notation, the production function for each final-
output sector can be written as 
(A1) Yi = Ci +   Ii,j+ Ii,s + Xi
= Fi (Li, K1,i, K2,i, K3,i, K4,i, Si, zi) 
for i = 1,…, 4,
where zi measures the level of multifactor pro-
ductivity. Although we do not explicitly model
foreign production, the capital stocks Kj,i should
be regarded as including imported capital goods
of type j. To ease the notational burden, we have
suppressed time subscripts in equation A1 and
will do so throughout this appendix.
The output of the semiconductor sector (Ys) is
either sold as intermediate input to the domestic
final-output sectors (Sd) or is exported (Sx). The
semiconductors purchased by each domestic
final-demand sector (Si) include imported semi-
conductors (S m), implying that the production sold
for domestic use can be written as Sd = ΣiSi – Sm.
We assume that semiconductor producers employ
labor and the same set of capital inputs as the
final-output sectors. With these assumptions,
(A2) Y s= Sd + Sx = Si+ Sx – Sm
= Fs (Ls, K1,s, K2,s, K3,s, K4,s, zs).
The next step is to define the relationship
between the sectoral variables and their aggregate
counterparts. Following the guidance of index num-
ber theory, we express the growth in aggregate final
output as a superlative index of growth in sectoral
final output. Let Z
•
≡ (∂Z/∂t)/Z denote the growth
in any variable Z. Then the growth of aggregate
nonfarm business output (Y ) in our model is
(A3)
where µi ≡ piYi/pY (for i = 1,…, 4), µS,x ≡ psSx/pY,
µS,m ≡ psSm/pY, and pY ≡Σ
4
i=1piYi + psSx – psSm.2
The prices of final output and semiconductors are
denoted by pi and ps, respectively, and pY repre-
sents aggregate current-dollar output. Equation A3
expresses the growth in aggregate output as a
share-weighted average of sectoral output growth,
where the shares are in current dollars. Note that
the semiconductors sold to domestic final-output
sectors are an intermediate input for those sectors
and thus do not appear in equation A3; only net
exports of semiconductors enter the equation,
consistent with the treatment of semiconductors
in the NIPAs.
The definition of labor and capital aggregates in
our model is very simple. We assume that labor input
used in a given sector is identical to that used in any
other sector. We also impose this assumption on
each typeof capital. Given these assumptions, we can
directly aggregate the sectoral inputs without the
need for superlative aggregation formulas. That is, 
(A4) L = Li+ Ls;
(A5) Kj = Kj,i+ Kj,s for j = 1,…, 4.
Moreover, with this setup, there is a common wage
rate (w) for labor in every sector and, likewise, a
common rental rate (rj) for all capital of type j.
Labor input in each sector is the product of
hours worked (Hi) and labor quality (qi), where
quality reflects the characteristics of the workers
employed in that sector. We allow labor quality to
change over time, but given our assumption of
identical labor input across sectors, qi must equal
a common value q in every sector at a given point
in time. Using equation A4, this implies that
YYS S
i
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(A6) L = qHi + qHs = qH,
where H represents aggregate hours worked. 
To derive the growth-accounting equation for
each sector, we impose the standard neoclassi-
cal assumptions of perfect competition and con-
stant returns to scale. We also assume that there
are no adjustment costs. Under these assump-
tions, profit-maximizing firms will set the mar-
ginal revenue product of each input equal to its
one-period cost: 
(A7) w = ps(∂F s/∂Ls)=   pi(∂F i/∂Li) for i = 1,…, 4;
(A8) rj= ps(∂F s/∂Kj,s) = pi(∂F i/∂Kj,i) 
for i, j = 1,…, 4;
(A9) ps = pi(∂F i/∂Si) for i = 1,…, 4.
If we totally differentiate equations A1 and A2
and then impose conditions A7 through A9, we
obtain the standard growth-accounting equations:
(A10) 




P i ≡ (∂F i/∂zi)/F i, MF
•
PS ≡ (∂F s/∂zs)/F s,
and the βs and  γs represent the following
income shares: βL
i ≡ wLi /piYi, the labor share in
sector i; βK
j,i ≡ rjKj,i/piYi, the share for capital of
type j in sector i; βS
i ≡ psSi /piYi, the semicon-
ductor share in sector i; γL ≡ wLs/psYs, the labor
share in the semiconductor sector; and γK
j ≡
rjKj,s /psYs, the share for capital of type j in the
semiconductor sector. Given the assumption of
constant returns, the income shares in each sec-
tor sum to one. 
Aggregate Labor Productivity 
Proposition 1 derives the expression for growth
in aggregate labor productivity in our model. 
Proposition 1. Assume that all markets are
perfectly competitive, that production exhibits
constant returns to scale in every sector, and that
input use is not subject to adjustment costs. Then,
in the model described by equations A1 through






























A11, the growth-accounting equation for aggregate

























Ps, αL = wL/pY,
αK
j = rjKj/pY, µi = piYi/pY, and µS = psY s/pY. 
Proof. To begin, substitute the expression for
Y
•
i from equation A10 into equation A3:
(A12)
where the second equality follows (after some
algebra) from the definitions of the αs, βs, and µs.
Next, totally differentiate equation A2 to obtain
(A13)
Multiplying equation A13 by µS and using the def-
initions of µS, µS,x, and µS,m, 
(A14)
Now, substitute equation A14 into equation A12,
which yields
(A15)
Next, totally differentiate equations A4 and A5:
(A16)
(A17) 
and substitute these equations into A15:
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1. When either I or K has a double subscript, the first subscript indicates the sector that produced the investment good
while the second subscript indicates the sector that uses it as an input to production.
2. Equation A3 is just one of several possible superlative indexes of output growth. It differs slightly from the Fisher chain
index used in the NIPAs. 
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(A18)
where the third equality follows from the definitions
of the αs, γs, and µs, and the fourth equality follows







from equation A6 and that the αs sum
to one under constant returns to scale. Hence,
(A19)
Substitute equation A19 into A18, which produces
(A20)
More on Aggregate MFP
Proposition 1 showed that aggregate MFP
growth in our model equals a share-weighted sum
of MFP growth in each sector. This result can be
rewritten to highlight the input-output connec-
tions between semiconductor producers and the
final-output sectors. In effect, we can integrate
semiconductor producers with the final-output
sectors that they supply. 
Proposition 2. Under the assumptions of
Proposition 1,
where 1+θ=Y S/Σ 4
i=1S i, the ratio of domestic semicon-
ductor output to domestic use of semiconductors.
Proof. Using equation A2 and recalling the
definitions of µi, βS
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Note that µS,x – µS,m can be written as µS( Sx – Sm)/
YS so that equation A21 becomes
(A22)
where the second equality follows from equa-
tion A2 and the third from the definition 1 + θ≡
YS/ Σ 4
i=1Si. Finally, substitute equation A22 into




To make use of Propositions 1 and 2, we need
to estimate MFP growth in each sector. This esti-
mate can be derived either from the sectoral pro-
duction functions, as in equations A10 and A11,
or from the sectoral cost functions—the “dual”
approach. We opt for the dual approach because
the required data are more readily available. The
dual counterparts to equations A10 and A11 are:
(A24)
for i = 1,…, 4; 
(A25)
These equations state that the growth in each
sector’s output price equals the growth in the
share-weighted average of its input costs minus
the growth in MFP. MFP growth enters with a
negative sign because efficiency gains hold down
a sector’s output price given its input costs. 
To reduce the amount of data needed to esti-
mate MFP growth from equations A24 and A25, we
assume that every sector has the same labor and
capital shares up to a scaling factor that reflects
the intensity of semiconductor use. That is, 
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(A26)                                       
and
for j = 1,…, 4.
One can easily verify that the restricted factor
shares sum to one in each sector. Also, given
equation A26, one can show (with some algebra)
that γL = αL and γK
j = αK
j; that is, the income shares
for aggregate nonfarm business equal their coun-
terparts in the semiconductor sector. Substituting
equation A26 into A24 and making use of the cor-
respondence between the γs and the αs, we obtain
(A27)












j) denote the share-weighted
growth in labor and capital costs for the nonfarm
business sector as a whole. Substitute V
•
into the
dual equations A25 and A27, noting that γL = αL
and γK
j = αK




where we have specifically identified sector 4,
which will serve as the numeraire sector. 
We now use the dual equations to derive
expressions for MFP growth in two cases. In the
first case, we infer the rates of sectoral MFP growth
that are consistent with an independent estimate
of aggregate MFP growth (from the Bureau of
Labor Statistics). This case represents the method-
ology we use to compute growth contributions
through 2001. In the second case, which we use
for our steady-state analysis, we solve for aggre-
gate MFP growth and MFP growth in sectors 1
through 3, conditional on an assumed pace of
MFP growth in sector 4. The next proposition
derives the expressions for sectoral MFP growth
in both cases.









(i = 1,…, 3) denote the rate of change in each
sector’s output price relative to that in sector 4.
Given the dual equations A28–A30, the solu-
tions for sectoral and aggregate MFP growth are
as follows.
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Case I: Conditioning on Aggregate MFP Growth
Case II: Conditioning on MFP Growth in Sector 4
Proof. The proof for Case II is nearly immedi-
ate. Subtract equation A29 from equations A28
and A30. After rearranging terms and using equa-
tion A30 to substitute MF
•






for i = 1,…, 3;
(A32)
Equations A31 and A32, plus the expression for
MF
•
P derived in Proposition 1, establish the results
for Case II. Note that the solution is recursive—first
solve for MF
•
P s from equation A32, then substitute
the result into equation A31, and finally substitute
all the sectoral MFP growth rates into the expres-
sion for aggregate MFP growth.
To prove the result for Case I, substitute equa-
tions A31 and A32 into the expression for aggre-
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(A34)
With tedious algebra, one can show that B simpli-
fies to be 1/(1 – βS
4). Using this expression for B,
equation A34 becomes
(A35)
This equation, combined with equations A31 and
A32, completes the proof for Case I. As in Case II,
the solution is recursive. First, solve for MF
•
P4from
equation A35. Then, substitute the result into
equations A31 and A32. 
Analysis of the Steady State 
The results presented so far do not require the
economy to have reached a steady state. We now
impose additional conditions to derive the growth-
accounting equation for aggregate labor produc-
tivity in the steady state.
The first steady-state condition is that labor







i for i = 1,…, 4.
We also require that all components of a given
sector’s output grow at the same rate. Referring
back to equations A1 and A2, this condition
implies the following for the final-output sectors




















i for i = 1,…, 4.
In addition, we require that all the growth rates in
equations A36–A38 be constant and that the
imported share of each sector’s capital stocks be
constant as well. Because Ij,i grows at a constant
rate over time, the stock of this (domestically
produced) capital will grow at the same constant
rate. Moreover, with the imported share of each
capital stock assumed to be constant, the total
stock, including imported capital, Kj,i, will grow at
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for all i and j. Combining these equalities with
equation A37, we obtain
(A39) for i, j = 1,…, 4.
Proposition 4. Under the steady-state condi-
tions in equations A36–A39 and the restrictions
on the income shares across sectors (equation
A26), the growth-accounting equation for aggre-
gate labor productivity is
where 
Proof. Substitute equations A26, A36, A38,
and A39 into the growth-accounting equations
A10 and A11, and recall that γL = αL and γK
j = αK
j
when we impose the cross-sector restrictions on
the income shares. The result is
(A40)
(A41)







S). Solving this system
yields
(A42)
for i = 1,…, 4;
(A43) 
Now, substitute equations A42 and A43 into equa-
tion A3 (the expression for growth in aggregate out-
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and that µS = Σ4
i=1µiβi
S +
µS,x– µS,m from equation A21, we obtain



























his appendix describes the data series used
in the paper. All data are annual and cover
the period from 1973 to 2001. Note that we have
not incorporated the July 2002 revision of the
NIPAs, which was released while the paper was
in production.
Real Output in the Nonfarm Business Sector (Y)
Data through 2000 are from the BLS multifac-
tor productivity data set. (The version we used was
released in March 2002.) In constructing output,
the BLS relies primarily on the BEA real output
series for nonfarm business less housing. Both
the BEA and BLS series are superlative indexes
of output. For 2001, we extended the BLS series
using annual growth rates of the BEA series for
real output in nonfarm business less housing
(NIPA, table 1.8).
Both the BLS and the BEA have incorporated
the effects of technical changes to the consumer
price index (CPI) back to 1978 (specifically, the
introduction of geometric means in the CPI).
However, the output data prior to 1978 must be
adjusted to be methodologically consistent with the
later data. According to the Economic Report
of the President (1999, 94), the introduction of
geometric means prior to 1978 would hold down
CPI inflation by 0.2 percentage point per year. From
1973 to 1977, consumption expenditures accounted
for about 85 percent of nonfarm business output
in current dollars. Thus, the incorporation of geo-
metric means prior to 1978 would reduce inflation
in nonfarm business prices by about 0.17 percent-
age point per year (0.2 × 0.85) through 1977 and
would boost growth in nonfarm business output by
the same amount each year. In 1978, the adjust-
ment is smaller because the growth rate for that
year, which depends on the level in 1977 and the
level in 1978, straddles the change in methodology.
To account for these effects, we added 0.17 per-
centage point to the growth rate of the BLS series
for nonfarm business output for each year through
1977 and 0.09 percentage point in 1978.
Price Index for Nonfarm Business Output (p)
We measured p as an implicit price deflator,
constructed as the ratio of current-dollar non-
farm business output to real nonfarm business
output from the BLS multifactor productivity
data set. To build in the effects of the CPI revision
described in the previous paragraph, we then
adjusted down the rate of change of this BLS
series by 0.17 percentage point annually for
1974–77 and by 0.09 percentage point for 1978.
For the rate of change in 2001, we extended the
BLS series using the annual growth rate of BEA’s
price index for nonfarm business less housing.
Capital Inputs (KC, KSW, KM, KO)
We constructed these capital inputs in two
steps. The first step develops productive capital
stocks for a detailed set of assets. The second
step aggregates these detailed stocks to the four
capital inputs used in our analysis.
Productive stocks for detailed types of
capital. For each type of capital, we took data
through 2000 directly from the BLS multifactor
productivity data set. The BLS constructs pro-
ductive stocks for highly disaggregated asset cat-
egories, starting with data on real investment for
sixty-one different types of business capital and
then translating these investment flows into pro-
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We extended these BLS productive stocks to
2001 as follows.1 For nonresidential fixed capi-
tal—which constitutes a large majority of all cap-
ital used in nonfarm business—we extended the
detailed BLS investment series to 2001 using
NIPA investment data for five broad asset groups:
computers and peripheral equipment, software,
communication equipment, other equipment, and
nonresidential structures. For each group except
computers and peripheral equipment, we used
the growth rate of investment in 2001 for the
group as a whole to extend the investment series
for each asset within the group. For example, we
used the 2001 growth rate for overall NIPA soft-
ware investment to extend the investment series
for each of the three different types of software.
For computers and peripheral equipment, we
employed a more refined procedure to capture
the differences in trend growth rates across the
assets in this important group. To begin, we used
the BLS data set to calculate the average growth
rate of investment in 1999 and 2000 for each type
of computer and peripheral equipment—main-
frames, personal computers, printers, terminals,
integrated systems, and three different types of
storage devices. These growth rates represented
our estimate of “trend” growth in investment for
2001 for each detailed category. Then we scaled
these trend rates so that the resulting individual
investment series would chain aggregate to the
level of total real investment in computers and
peripheral equipment in 2001.2
Given an estimate of real investment in 2001
for each type of nonresidential fixed capital, we
extended the BLS productive capital stocks to 2001
with the perpetual inventory method. Specifically,
for each detailed asset type, we calculated a trans-
lation factor (ft) for each year through 2000 from
the following equation:
Kt = ftKt–1 + (It + It–1)/2,
where (following BLS methodology) Kt is mea-
sured as the average of the stocks at the end of
years t and t – 1. We used the value of ft in 2000
and the detailed investment data to construct
productive stocks for each type of nonresidential
fixed capital for 2001.
The other assets included in the BLS measure
of nonfarm business capital are tenant-occupied
rental housing, inventories, and land. For tenant-
occupied rental housing, we extended the BLS
productive stock to 2001 with a simple regression
equation. This equation regressed the BLS pro-
ductive stock on its own lag and on real invest-
ment in multifamily residential structures from
the NIPAs. The coefficients from this equation,
combined with NIPA data on investment in multi-
family structures for 2001, generated the estimate
of the stock of tenant-occupied rental housing in
2001. For the stock of inventories, we extended
the BLS series to 2001 using NIPA inventory data.
For the stock of land, we extended the BLS series
to 2001 with the average growth rate of this stock
for the five years through 2000.
Aggregation. The BLS uses the Tornquist for-
mula to aggregate the detailed productive capi-
tal stocks into measures of capital services. The
Tornquist aggregate is a weighted average of the
growth rates of the various productive stocks, with
the weight for each asset type equal to its esti-
mated share of total capital income. To construct
our capital aggregate for computer and peripheral
equipment (KC), we applied the Tornquist formula
to the eight components of such equipment. For
software (KSW), we followed a similar procedure
for the three different types of software. For com-
munication equipment (KM), the capital services
aggregate just equals the productive stock; the
Tornquist formula is not needed because we have
no asset detail within this aggregate. Finally, to
construct KO, our first step was to extend the BLS
measure of aggregate capital services to 2001
(using the Tornquist formula). Then, we stripped
out computer and peripheral equipment, software,
and communication equipment from aggregate
capital services to arrive at KO.
Labor Hours (H)
Through 2000, labor hours are from the BLS
multifactor productivity data set. We extended the
data to 2001 using the growth rate in hours of all
persons in the nonfarm business sector from the
BLS Productivity and Cost release.
Labor Quality (q)
The BLS measures labor quality as the differ-
ence in the growth rate of labor input and labor
hours. To calculate labor input, the BLS divides the
labor force into a number of age-sex-education
cells and then constructs a weighted average of
growth in hours worked in each cell, with the
weight for each cell equal to its share of total
labor compensation. Through 2000, our measure
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of labor quality is from the BLS multifactor pro-
ductivity data set. For 2001, we assumed that
labor quality generated a contribution of 0.25 per-
centage point to growth in labor productivity, its
average contribution over 1996–2000.
Income Shares (α αj)
The income share for each detailed type of
nonresidential fixed capital in a given year was
calculated from the following equation:
αj = (R + δj – Πj)pjKjTj/pY.
We discuss each component of this equation below.
Note that these income shares vary from year to
year and are not fixed at a period-average value.
For tenant-occupied rental housing, inventories,
and land, the income shares through 2000 were
taken directly from the BLS multifactor productiv-
ity data set. For 2001, we extrapolated forward the
BLS year-2000 level of capital income for each asset
using the trend growth rate from 1995 to 2000. We
then divided the estimated 2001 capital income
for each asset by total income in nonfarm business
to obtain income shares. 
Once we estimated the income-share series for
each capital asset, the income share for labor equaled
unity minus the total income share for capital.
Depreciation rate (δ δj). For the most part,
the depreciation rate for each type of equipment
and structure comes from the BEA (as presented
in Fraumeni 1997, 18–19). However, as indicated
above, the BEA provides very little information
on depreciation rates for the individual types of
computers and peripheral equipment; we followed
Whelan (2000) and set these depreciation rates
equal to a geometric approximation calculated
from the BEA capital stocks and investment flows.
For personal computers, we are uncomfortable
with the BEA’s procedure for depreciation rates,
and instead we set the depreciation rate for PCs
equal to the 30 percent annual rate for mainframe
computers.3 For software, we used the BEA
depreciation rates described by Herman (2000,
19). The BEA assumes that prepackaged software
has a service life of three years and a depreciation
rate of 55 percent per year; own-account and cus-
tom software each have service lives of five years
and a depreciation rate of 33 percent per year.
Expected nominal capital gain/loss (Π Πj).
We calculated Πj as a three-year moving average
of the percent change in the price of asset j (pj).
The moving average serves as a proxy for the
unobserved expectation of price change. Through
2000, the pj series for each asset is the investment
price index from the BLS multifactor productivity
data set. Each pj series was extended to 2001
using the same procedure as that employed for
real investment for each asset. Specifically, we
extended the detailed BLS price series to 2001
1. The BLS actually relies on a two-way disaggregation by type of asset and by industry. For our analysis, we used data by
asset that already have been aggregated across industries. 
2. This scaling procedure does not generate sensible results if the estimated trend growth rate of investment for a par-
ticular asset differs in sign from the actual 2001 change for the broader group to which it belongs. Because such sign
differences periodically occur for some assets within software, communication equipment, other equipment, and non-
residential structures, we used the simpler procedure described above for extending investment in business fixed
assets other than computer hardware.
3. As described in Herman (2000, 20), the BEA sets the depreciation rate for personal computers so that 10 percent of
the original value remains after five years of service, which implies an annual geometric depreciation rate of 37 percent.
By construction, this depreciation rate captures the full loss of value during each year of the assumed five-year service
life. In contrast, the BEA’s depreciation rates for other types of computer hardware are constructed to capture only the
loss of value over and above the decline in the asset’s constant-quality price index (Πj). This concept of depreciation is
the appropriate one to combine with Πj in order to measure the full loss of asset value in the formula for the income
share. However, for personal computers, the BEA’s depreciation rate, when combined with Πj, double-counts the loss
of value. One fix for this problem would be to drop the Πjterm from the income-share formula for PCs. However, doing
so would be appropriate only if the BEA’s depreciation rate of 37 percent accurately measures the full loss of value.
While there is relatively little hard evidence on this subject, our sense is that PCs typically lose more than 37 percent
of their value over the course of a year. Thus, dropping the Πj term from the user cost formula does not seem an ade-
quate solution to this problem. Instead, we set δj for PCs equal to the value for mainframes (30 percent per year) and
plugged this value into the income-share formula, along with the value of Πjfor PCs. This may not be an ideal approach,
but given the very limited research on depreciation for PCs, we judged it to be the best choice at present. (For a fuller
discussion of related issues, see Oliner 1994.) Similar problems may affect other assets as well, and we believe that
future research in this area is crucial.40 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Third Quarter 2002
using NIPA investment prices for five broad cate-
gories of nonresidential fixed investment: comput-
ers and peripheral equipment, software, commu-
nication equipment, other equipment, and non-
residential structures.4 For each individual asset,
the resulting rate of price change was applied to
the year-2000 level of pj to calculate pj for 2001.
Current-dollar productive capital stock
(pjKj). For each asset, this series is simply the
product of the real productive stock (Kj) and the
asset price index (pj), both of which are dis-
cussed above.
Tax adjustment (Tj). For each asset, this
adjustment equals (1 – c – τv)/(1 – τ), where c is
the rate of investment tax credit, τ is the corpo-
rate tax rate, and v is the present value of $1 of
tax depreciation allowances. Karl Whelan kindly
provided these series, which are discussed fur-
ther in Whelan (1999).
Current-dollar nonfarm business output
(pY). Through 2000, this series is from the BLS
multifactor productivity data set. For 2001, we
extended the BLS series using the annual growth
rate of the BEA series for current-dollar output in
the nonfarm business sector less housing.
Nominal net return (R). We calculated R as
the ex post net return earned on the productive
stock of nonresidential equipment and struc-
tures. Thus, we obtained R as the solution to the
following equation for each year in our sample:
N
j=1




where the summations are over all N types of non-
residential equipment, software, and structures.
This procedure yielded an annual series for R
through 2000. For 2001, we estimated R from a
regression with the following explanatory variables:
a constant, two lags of R, the rate of price change
for nonfarm business output, the acceleration in
real nonfarm business output, the unemployment
rate, and the share of corporate profits in GNP.
Current-Dollar Output Shares (µ µC, µ µSW, µ µM, µ µS, µ µO)
The denominator of each output share is current-
dollar nonfarm business output (pY), the data
source for which was described above. Here, we
focus on the measurement of current-dollar sec-
toral output, the numerator in each share.
Computer sector. We used NIPA data on final
sales of computers to measure current-dollar
computer output (pCYC). NIPA final sales equals
the sum of current-dollar spending on computers
and peripheral equipment in the following cate-
gories: private fixed investment, personal consump-
tion expenditures, government expenditures, and
net exports of goods and services. This sum omits
the small portion of final computer output that
ends up in business inventories because the NIPA
inventory data do not break out computing equip-
ment from other inventories.
Software sector. To estimate p SWYSW, we
started with unpublished data from the BEA on
current-dollar final sales of software from 1987 to
2000. We then adjusted this series for software
not produced in the nonfarm business sector by
stripping out the BEA estimate of own-account
software produced by the government.5 Finally,
we extended the 1987 level back to earlier years
and the 2000 level forward to 2001 using NIPA
data on growth in current-dollar software invest-
ment by businesses.
Communication equipment sector. To esti-
mate pMYM, we used unpublished data from the
BEA on total current-dollar final sales of communi-
cation equipment from 1997 to 2000. We extended
the 1997 level back in time and the 2000 level for-
ward to 2001 using NIPA data on the growth of
current-dollar business investment in communi-
cation equipment.
Semiconductor sector. Our series for current-
dollar semiconductor output (pSYS) equals current-
dollar shipments of products in SIC category 36741
(integrated microcircuits). Federal Reserve Board
staff construct this shipments series as an input to
the Board’s index of industrial production, using
Census Bureau reports through 1999 and trade
data from the Semiconductor Industry Association
(SIA) for 2000 and 2001. Because the shipments
series is not available before 1977, we set the value
of the semiconductor output share (µS) during
1973–76 equal to its 1977 value.
Other final-output sector. We estimated
current-dollar output in this sector (pOYO) as a
residual after accounting for all other components
of nonfarm business output:
pOYO = pY – pCYC – pSWYSW – pMYM – pS(Sx – Sm),
where the final term is current-dollar net exports of
semiconductors. (This is the only part of semicon-
ductor production that shows up in domestic final
output.) The data sources for pY, pCY C, pSWY SW, and





4current-dollar net exports of semiconductors as fol-
lows. For the period from 1989 to 2001, we started
with series constructed by Federal Reserve Board
staff for current-dollar exports and imports of prod-
ucts in SIC code 3674 (semiconductors and related
devices), which are based on detailed figures from
the International Trade Commission. Because the
3674 category is broader than just semiconductors,
we scaled the export and import series for SIC code
3674 down to 36741 (integrated microcircuits)
using the ratio of domestic shipments in 36741 to
domestic shipments in 3674. Prior to 1989, we did
not have detailed trade data, and we extended the
export and import series back in time using the rate
of change in domestic shipments of semiconduc-
tors (the series pSYSdescribed above).
Ratio of Semiconductor Output to 
Domestic Semiconductor Use (1 + θ θ)
Domestic semiconductor use can be expressed
as domestic semiconductor output minus net
exports of semiconductors. Thus,
1 +  θ = YS/ [YS– (Sx – Sm)] 
= pSYS/ [pSYS – (pSSx – pSSm)],
where the second equality converts each series to
current dollars. The data sources for pSYS and
pSSx – pSSm were described above.
Rates of Relative Price Change (π πC, π πSW, π πM, π πS)
Each πi series(i = C, SW, M, and S) represents
the rate of change in the price ratio pi /pO. Here,
we describe the data source for each price series
that enters these ratios.
Computer sector. pC is measured as an implicit
price deflator for the output of computers in the
NIPAs. We calculated this deflator as the ratio of
current-dollar computer output (defined as the sum
of all final sales of computers and denoted above by
pCYC) to a chain aggregate of real outlays for the
same spending categories, which we denote by YC.
Software sector. pSW is an implicit price
deflator for software produced in the nonfarm
business sector. Using NIPA data, we calculated
this deflator as the ratio of current-dollar soft-
ware output (the series pSWYSW described above)
to a chain aggregate of real software outlays
denoted by YSW. To construct YSW, we did a “chain
strip-out” of government own-account software
from total final sales of software, parallel to our
calculation of the current-dollar series. The
growth rate of the resulting aggregate series for
real software outlays was about 1 percentage
point per year higher than the growth rate of real
business investment in software over 1987–2000,
the period over which we can construct YSW. To
extend YSW back to years before 1987 and forward
to 2001, we used the annual growth rates of real
business investment in software adjusted by this
1987–2000 wedge.6
Communication equipment sector. pM is an
implicit deflator for the output of communication
equipment in the NIPAs. We calculated this deflator
as the ratio of current-dollar outlays for communi-
cation equipment (the series pMYM defined above)
to a chain aggregate of real outlays denoted by YM
and constructed in an analogous manner to pMYM.
To calculate YM we used unpublished data from
the BEA on total real final sales of communication
equipment from 1997 to 2000. We extended the
1997 level back in time and the 2000 level to 2001
using published NIPA data on the growth of real
business investment in communication equipment.
Other final-output sector. Like the other
price series, pO is an implicit deflator, which
equals the ratio of current-dollar output for this
sector (the series pOYO defined above) to a chain
aggregate of the sector’s real output (YO). We
constructed YO by starting with our series for real
nonfarm business output (Y) and then chain-
stripping-out all other components of Y (that is,
real output of computers, software, and commu-
nication equipment, along with real exports and
41 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Third Quarter 2002
4. Just as for the investment series, the scaling procedure that we used for computer hardware does not generate sensi-
ble results if the trend rate of price change for a particular asset differs in sign from the actual 2001 change for the
broader group to which it belongs. Because these sign differences occur for some noncomputer price series, we
employed the simpler extrapolation method described above to extend the price series for nonresidential fixed invest-
ment other than computer hardware.
5. Estimates of government own-account software from 1996 to 2000 are available as unpublished data from the BEA. In
addition, Parker and Grimm (2000) provide estimates of government own-account software for 1979 and 1992. Using
these values, we linearly interpolated the government own-account series backward in time.
6. Real software output is the only extrapolated series for which we used a wedge adjustment. For other extrapolated
series, there was not a significant difference between the growth rate of the series in question and the extrapolator series. 42 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Third Quarter 2002
imports of semiconductors). Roughly speaking,
the chain strip-out inverts equation A3 in
Appendix 1 to solve for the growth of YO, and the
resulting growth rates are then linked together to
create a series in index levels. To construct the
series for real exports and imports of semicon-
ductors needed for the chain strip-out, we
assumed that the price of exports and imports of
semiconductors was equal to the semiconductor
price series described in the next paragraph.
Semiconductor sector. For 1977–2001, the
data source for pS is the deflator for SIC 36741
that Federal Reserve staff developed to estimate
industrial production; we used this series to com-
pute the annual percent change in pS for 1978
through 2001. For years before 1978, we calculated
the percent change in pS by extrapolating back in
time using data from Grimm (1998). Specifically,
we calculated the average annual percent change
between 1974 and 1977 in Grimm’s “Summary
price index for MOS memory chips” (p. 12), and
then took the ratio of this average 1974–77 per-
cent change to the percent change for 1978 based
on the Federal Reserve series. We multipied the
1978 percent change in the Federal Reserve
series by this ratio and used the resulting value as
the percent change in pS for each year from 1974
to 1977.
Semiconductors as a Share of Current-Dollar









Computer sector. We set β
S
C equal to 0.3 for
all years. That is, we assumed that semiconduc-
tors account for 30 percent of the current-dollar
input cost of computer producers. This value lies
at the middle of the range employed by Triplett
(1996). Although the SIA publishes data on semi-
conductor usage by the computer industry, these
data are not appropriate for our purpose. As
noted by Flamm (1997, 11), the SIA data cover
only the semiconductors sold by “merchant” pro-
ducers in the open market; these data exclude
“captive” production by U.S. computer manufac-
turers, notably IBM. Thus, the SIA-based measure
would greatly understate semiconductor use dur-
ing the 1970s and 1980s, when IBM was the dom-
inant U.S. computer producer.
Software sector. We set β
S
SW to zero because
semiconductors are not a direct input to software
production. (Of course, the software industry uses
computers and communication equipment that
contain semiconductors, but it does not directly
use semiconductors.)
Communication equipment sector. We used
data from the SIA to construct β
S
M. The SIA provides
data on worldwide shipments of semiconductors
for 1976–2001. The SIA also publishes data for
1985–94 on the share of these worldwide ship-
ments purchased by producers of communication
equipment in the United States. After 1994, the SIA
redefined this latter series to cover “the Americas.”
We linked the series on the U.S.-only share through
1994 with the series on the Americas share from
1995 forward. (Because the share figures are avail-
able only back to 1985, we set this share for earlier
years equal to the 1985 value.) We then multiplied
the resulting share series by worldwide semicon-
ductor shipments to calculate the current-dollar
value of semiconductors used by the communica-
tion equipment industry in the United States. (To
the extent that semiconductors are used to pro-
duce communication equipment elsewhere in
North or South America, the series will overstate
semiconductor use in the United States alone from
1995 forward.) To construct β
S
M, we divided the
series just described by our estimate of the current-
dollar value of communication equipment pro-
duced in the United States, pMYM. Prior to 1976 (for
which data on worldwide semiconductor shipments
are not available), we set β
S
M equal to its 1976 value.
Other final-output sector. To estimate β
S
O,
recall the expression for µS in equation A22 of
Appendix 1:
which can be written with explicit sectoral nota-
tion as
Solving this equation for β
S
O yields
The data sources for all series on the right-hand side
of this expression have already been discussed.
β
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